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The consolidation of the Iranian Revolution refers to a turbulent process of Islamic Republic stabilization, following the completion of the revolution. After the Shah of Iran and his regime were overthrown by revolutionaries in February 1979, Iran was in a "revolutionary crisis mode" from this time until 1982〔 or 1983.〔 Its economy and the apparatus of government collapsed. Military and security forces were in disarray. Following the events of the revolution, Marxist guerrillas and federalist parties revolted in some regions comprising Khuzistan, Kurdistan and Gonbad-e Qabus, which resulted in fighting between them and revolutionary forces. These revolts began in April 1979 and lasted between several months to over a year, depending on the region. Recently published documents show that US was afraid of those revolts. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed with his staff about a possible American invasion of Iran by using Turkish bases and territory if the Soviets would decide to repeat Afghanistan scenario in Iran.〔Mehmet Akif Okur, "The American Geopolitical Interests and Turkey on the Eve of the September 12, 1980 Coup", CTAD, Vol.11, No.21, p. 210-211 https://www.academia.edu/13255404/The_American_Geopolitical_Interests_and_Turkey_on_the_Eve_of_the_September_12_1980_Coup_12_Eyl%C3%BCl_1980_Darbesi_nin_E%C5%9Fi%C4%9Finde_Amerikan_Jeopolitik_%C3%87%C4%B1karlar%C4%B1_ve_T%C3%BCrkiye http://www.ctad.hacettepe.edu.tr/ctad_21_1.pdf 〕 By 1982 or 1983, Khomeini and his supporters had crushed the rival factions and consolidated power. Elements that played a part in both the crisis and its end were the Iran Hostage Crisis, the invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and the presidency of Abolhassan Banisadr.〔''Encyclopedia of Islam and Muslim World'', Thomson Gale, 2004, p. 357 (article by Stockdale, Nancy, L. who uses the phrase "revolutionary crisis mode")〕〔Keddie, ''Modern Iran'', (2006), p. 241〕 ==Conflicts amongst revolutionaries== With the fall of the Shah, the glue that unified the various ideological (religious, liberal, secularist, Marxist, and Communist) and class (bazaari merchant, secular middle class, poor) factions of the revolution—opposed to the Shah—was gone.〔Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p. 112〕 Different interpretations of the broad goals of the revolution (an end to tyranny, more Islamic and less American and Western influence, more social justice and less inequality) and different interests, vied for influence. Some observers believe "what began as an authentic and anti-dictatorial popular revolution based on a broad coalition of all anti-Shah forces was soon transformed into an Islamic fundamentalist power-grab,"〔Zabih, Sepehr, ''Iran Since the Revolution'' Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, p. 2〕 that significant support came from Khomeini's non-theocratic allies who had thought he intended to be more a spiritual guide than a ruler〔Schirazi, ''Constitution of Iran'', (1997), pp. 93–94〕—Khomeini being in his mid-70s, having never held public office, been out of Iran for more than a decade, and having told questioners things like "the religious dignitaries do not want to rule."〔"(Democracy? I meant theocracy )", by Dr. Jalal Matini, translation & introduction by Farhad Mafie, August 5, 2003, ''The Iranian''.〕〔(Islamic Clerics ), (Khomeini Promises Kept ), (Gems of Islamism ).〕 Another view Khomeini had was "overwhelming ideological, political and organizational hegemony,"〔Azar Tabari, "Mystifications of the Past and Illusions of the Future," in ''The Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: Proceedings of a Conference,'' ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1982) pp. 101–24.〕 and non-theocratic groups never seriously challenged Khomeini's movement in popular support.〔For example, Islamic Republic Party and allied forces controlled approximately 80% of the seats on the Assembly of Experts of Constitution. (see: Bakhash, ''Reign of the Ayatollahs'' (1983) pp. 78–82) An impressive margin even allowing for electoral manipulation〕 Still another is that of government supporters (such as Hamid Ansari) who insist that Iranians opposed to the new ruling state were "fifth columnists" led by foreign countries attempting to overthrow the Iranian government.〔Ansari, Hamid, ''Narrative of Awakening : A Look at Imam Khomeini's Ideal, Scientific and Political Biography from Birth to Ascension'' by Hamid Ansari, Institute for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, International Affairs Division, (publication date, preface dated 1994 ) translated by Seyed Manoochehr Moosavi, pp. 165–67〕 Khomeini and his loyalists in the revolutionary organizations prevailed, making use of unwanted allies,〔Moin, ''Khomeini'' (2000), p. 224〕 (such as Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Revolutionary Government), and eliminating one-by-one with skillful timing both them and their adversaries from Iran's political stage,〔Moin, ''Khomeini'' (2000), p. 203.〕 and implemented Khomeini's velayat-e faqih design for an Islamic Republic led by himself as Supreme Leader.〔Schirazi, ''Constitution of Iran'', (1997), pp. 24–32.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Consolidation of the Iranian Revolution」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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